THE EFFECT OF RELATED-PARTY TRANSACTION, PROFITABILITY, LEVERAGE, AND EXECUTIVE EQUITY INCENTIVES ON THE OCCURRENCE OF ACCOUNTING IRREGULARITIES (AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON NON-FINANCIAL COMPANIES LISTED ON IDX YEAR 2012-2014) | ELECTRONIC THESES AND DISSERTATION

Electronic Theses and Dissertation

Universitas Syiah Kuala

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THE EFFECT OF RELATED-PARTY TRANSACTION, PROFITABILITY, LEVERAGE, AND EXECUTIVE EQUITY INCENTIVES ON THE OCCURRENCE OF ACCOUNTING IRREGULARITIES (AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON NON-FINANCIAL COMPANIES LISTED ON IDX YEAR 2012-2014)


Pengarang

Cut Chaira Ashdiqa - Personal Name;

Dosen Pembimbing



Nomor Pokok Mahasiswa

1201103040010

Fakultas & Prodi

Fakultas / / PDDIKTI :

Subject
-
Kata Kunci
-
Penerbit

Banda Aceh : Universitas Syiah Kuala., 2016

Bahasa

Indonesia

No Classification

-

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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to examine the determinants of accounting
irregularities from its management, financial activities, and conditions. Based on
fraud triangle theory and agency theory, variables related party transaction,
profitability, leverage, and executive equity incentives are hypothesized to affect the
occurrence of accounting irregularities. The occurrence of accounting irregularities
was measured using dummy variable based on the incidence of financial restatement
which resulted from either error or fraud. By using purposive sampling method, this
study has drawn sample of 46 companies and 46 matched-pairs from total non-financial companies listed in IDX year 2012-2014. The hypothesis testing is done
through binary logistic regression. The result of this study shows that, related party
transaction which was measured by the percentage of receivables with related parties
and profitability which was measured by ROA, have a significant positive impact on
the occurrence of accounting irregularities. On the other hand, variable leverage
measured by debt-to-equity and executive equity incentives measured by managerial
ownership are not proven to be significantly affect the occurrence of accounting
irregularities.
Keywords: Accounting irregularities, related party transaction, profitability, leverage,
executive equity incentives

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